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Introduction 
Seeds are encapsulated plant embryos; their nature is to grow into new plants if there 
are appropriate conditions. Producing food for the growing human population 
demanded increases in yields that will hardly meet with the traditional methods 
of plant breeding. Biotechnology provided the means to create seeds tolerant to 
herbicides, weeds, and droughts. However, seeds are still seeds, they will reproduce 
themselves and provide to their offspring the improvements genetically introduced 
in them if they are properly nourished and regardless of the country they are in. 
The self-replicating nature of seeds challenges the very essence of IP rights. 
The rationale behind IP rights is to secure commercial exclusivity to recoup the 
investment made in creating new technologies. But how to recover the huge in-
vestment made to identify a particular gene that will render a plant resistant to 
herbicides, if by selling a single seed identical copies will naturally grow from it. 
License agreements provide a legal solution. Instead of directly commercializing 
final seeds, licensing the fragmented use of genetic traits, indispensable for the 
creation of transgenic seeds, enables the worldwide distribution of technologies 
as well as the charge of fees all along the value chain.
License agreements can be concluded between parties located in different 
countries for the conduction of just one or several of the activities required to 
introduce a gene into a cultivable seed. They may also include ancillary provisions 
restricting the business of the licensee by fencing the territory where it is allowed 
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to exploit the technology and prohibiting the importation or exportation of it. 
Such restrictions might hinder the ordinary course of international trade as well 
as the development of competing technologies. This paper aims to evaluate how 
different jurisdictions have had address the anticompetitive practices employed to 
enlarge the scope of national IP rights and capture fees through license agreements.
The first section of this paper describes the scene in the international market 
of seeds, how it became such a concentrated market, the decisive role of IP rights 
within it and the interplay between patent holders, plant breeders and farmers 
within the market of seeds. Secondly, it will be explained why multinationals 
impose restrictions on international markets; to then approach case law from 
the European Union, United States, Brazil and Argentina, searching for different 
solutions to this issue. The final section concludes. 
1. The international market of seeds
1.1. General background 
The advent of biotechnology reshaped the scene of agriculture1. The possibility of 
modifying plant`s genetic information to make them resistant to pesticides and 
herbicides increased agriculture’s productivity and profits. Artificial hybridization 
and genetic use restriction technologies (gurts), overthrow natural barriers for the 
entry, expansion, and consolidation of multinational enterprises in the seed market. 
Artificial hybridization forces farmers to constantly purchase seeds to preserve the 
levels of yields achieve in previous harvest, as those corps do not present the same 
yield when reproduced from seeds of previous harvest2. Recently, gurts barriers 
the movement of genes between plants, making possible to limit the expression 
of desirable traits in the offspring of genetically modified corps3. Again, it forces 
farmers to purchase seeds once and again. These technologies create a demand for 
indispensable inputs that used to be freely available for farmers4.
The yield improvements brought by biotechnology incentivize the adoption of 
these technologies. According with the International Service for the Acquisition of 
Agri-biotech Applications, during the last 20 years the biotechnology implementa-
tion in agriculture increased crop yields by 22%, profits by 68%, and alleviated 
1 Kloppenburg, Ralph Jack, First the seed: The political economy of plant biotechnology, 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. 
2 Ibid., 93.
3 Lence, Sergio H. and others, “Welfare impacts of intellectual property protection in 
the seed industry”,  American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2005, 87(4), pp. 951-968.
4 Srinivasan, C. S. and Thirtle, Colin, “Potential economic impacts of terminator 
technologies: policy implications for developing countries”, Environment and Development 
Economics, 2003, 8(01), pp. 187-205. See also: Yusuf, Mansir, “Ethical issues in the use 
of the terminator seed technology”, African Journal of Biotechnology, 2010, 9(52), pp. 
8901-8904. 
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poverty by more than 16.5 million small farmers5. The implementation of biotech-
corps is high in developed and developing countries. The United States (U.S.) leads 
globally the authorization for the cultivation of biotech crops6, whereas Brazil, 
Argentina, China, India and South Africa lead within their respective continents7. 
The demand for technological improvements in the seed industry pressures 
companies to develop the next cutting-edge technology8 which requires high in-
vestments in research and development activities (Herein after R&D). Between 
2010 and 2014 the overall cost of discovering and developing a product to protect 
crop was up to €215 million9; it takes 11.3 years10, and requires to research and 
synthesize over 159.754 possible products of which only one is launch11. There-
fore, developing the next blockbuster product, recoup the investment and gather 
enough resources to fund the following generation of technologies poses huge 
pressures upon multinationals.
The rush to develop new biotech products triggered a series of mergers and 
acquisitions resulting in a highly-concentrated industry. During the 1980’s to 
1990’s the agricultural biotechnology industry (ag-biotechnology) went through 
a “transitional phase” with a series of mergers and acquisition among several 
companies which used to offer different products12. It ends up with transgenic 
plants flooding the market13 and with basf, Bayer, Dow, DuPont, Monsanto and 
Syngenta becoming into the Big Six firms, which globally dominate the market. 
Three of them might engage in further integrations: DuPont announced its merger 
with Dow14 and Bayer plans to buy Monsanto15. Competition authorities in the 
5 International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications. isaaa Brief 
49-2014: Top Ten Facts. Available at: at http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/
briefs/49/toptenfacts/default.asp 
6 International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications isaa. isaaa 
Brief 49-2014: Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2014. Available 
at: http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/49/executivesummary/default.asp. 
See also U.S. Department of Agriculture. Genetically Engineered Crops in the United 
States, 2014. Available at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1282246/err162.pdf
7 Ibid. 
8 Kloppenburg, R. J. (n1), pp. 297-300. See also Syngenta Cp / Advanta (Case 
Comp/M.3465) [2004] Document No 32004M3465. OJ C 263/7 § 46.
9 McDougall, Phillips. “The Cost of New Agrochemical Product Discovery”, Develop-
ment and Registration in 1995, 2000, 2005-8 and 2010 to 2014. R&D expenditure in 2014 
and expectations for 2019, 2016. Consultancy Study for CropLife International, CropLife 
America and the European Crop Protection Association. Available at: http://www.croplifeam-
erica.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Phillips-McDougall-Final-Report_4.6.16.pdf 12.
10 Ibid., 19. 
11 Ibid., 18. 
12 Hobbs, Jill E. “The private sector: mnes and smes”, in Smyth and others 
(eds.), Handbook on Agriculture, Biotechnology and Development, Edward Elgar, 2014, 57.
13 Ibid., 58. 
14 Benoit, David; Cimilluca, Dana; Mattioli, Dana and Bunge, Jacob, “Dow 
Chemical and DuPont are in Advanced Talks to Merge”, Wall Street Journal, 2015. Available 
at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-chemical-and-dupont-are-in-advanced-talks-to-merge-1449621799
15 Bunge, Jacob and Mattioli, Dana, “Bayer Proposes to Acquire Monsanto”, Wall 
Street Journal, 2016. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/bayermakestakeoverap-
proachtomonsanto1463622691
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U.S.16 and Europe17 have conditioned integrations among those companies to the 
licensing and sale of assets required for developing ag-biotech products to preserve 
adequate levels of competition. 
1.2. The impact of Ip rights recognition 
The recognition of IP rights over ag-biotechnology inputs, due to multilateral trade 
agreements, is the glue holding the international seeds market together. Thanks to 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (trips), 
microorganism patentability became an international threshold as well as the 
protection of plant varieties18. Although there is no international consensus about 
whether plants and living matter should be patentable19, trips mandates to protect 
them through IP regimes setting the ground field for biotechnology development. 
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(upov) design to protect new, distinct, stable, and uniform plant varieties20 has 
been implemented in many countries to fulfil trips mandate. Though, Plant 
Breeder’s Rights (P.B.R.) protection is substantially different to the one provided 
by patents. Depending on the version of the Treaty each country had adopted, 
whether it was upov 1978 or 1991, P.B.R. can be subject to one or both of the 
following exceptions: the farmer’s privilege and the plant breeder’s exception, by 
which farmers and plant breeders are entitled to use the plant without prior au-
thorization21. Patents are not subject to these exceptions.
Considering that patent’s essence is to allow its holder to exclude others from 
“making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes” the pro-
tected product22. Creating a genetically modified seed involves three basic stages 
which raw material are genetic traits, which is normally patented by multination-
als23. Those stages are: development, multiplication and, commercialization. At 
the development stage, the germplasm containing the desirable trait, like herbicide 
tolerance, is introgress into a parent or basic seed stable enough for cultivation. 
At the multiplication stage, the parent seed is propagated to a commercial scale, 
to be marketed among farmers, food processors, retailers, etc. Therefore, all the 
16 U. S. Department of Justice. Press Release. Justice Department Approves Monsanto’s 
Acquisition of Dekalb Genetics Corporation, 1998. Available at: www.usdoj.gov
17 Syngenta Cp / Advanta, 2004, (n. 8) § 106.
18 Cf. trips, Article 27(3).
19 World Trade Organization. The Relationship Between The Trips Agreement and 
The Convention On Biological Diversity Paper, 2006. Available at: https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/trips_e/ipcw368_e.pdf 
20 Cf. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. United 
Nations, 1991, Article 5.
21 Ibid., Article 15. 2.
22 Cf. trips, Article 28. 
23 Harl, Neil E., “The Age of Contract Agriculture: Consequences of Concentration 
in Input Supply”, Journal of Agribusiness, 2000, 18(1), 115-128. See also Lim, Daryl, 
“Living with Monsanto”, Michigan State Law Review, 2015, 559-663.
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stages fall within the realm of patentee entitlement to exclude others from using 
the germplasm; albeit, without the seed the germplasm is useless.
Each stage requires advanced knowledge and specialization. In fact, the spread 
use of ag-biotechnology and genetically modified seed gave way to the emergence 
of new and specialized players: seed growers and conditioners, and plant breeders24. 
These new actors condition trait and seeds to the weather and pests’ conditions 
of different geographic areas25. A trait might be useful in several countries and 
corps; it might be desirable to allow plant breeders located in different countries 
to develop a parent seed cultivable in different territories. 
However, IP rights are territorial, they are granted country by country to be 
effective within the territory of the issuing State. There are international treaties 
to facilitate the recognition of such rights but none of them grants a global-wide 
protection26. The initiative to create a unitary patent for Europe has been discuss 
for decades and, although Regulation n.º 1257/2012[27] would make it possible, 
it is not yet a reality. In the meantime, nothing impedes a patentee from licensing 
with a plant breeder located abroad, authorizing him to use the trait.
Unlike patents and P.B.R, genetics is universal and perpetual. A gene resistant 
to herbicides will keep its properties regardless of its location, and such feature will 
pass into its offspring until another genetic modification occurs. Furthermore, due 
to the natural self-reproduction of seeds, no reverse engineer process is needed to 
replicate the trait, the seed will grant access to it. It becomes evident, that without 
a legal or natural measure to prevent third parties from replicating the seed, once 
it is sold for the first time, there would be no incentive to pay for it repeatedly.
The case of Bowman v. Monsanto28 illustrates the above. Bowman purchased 
soybean seeds intend for human or animal feed; the seeds had herbicide traits 
patented by Monsanto; Bowman replanted the seeds without paying fees nor 
concluded any agreement. Still, the seed was herbicide tolerant and Bowman 
replanted it for some years before being suit by Monsanto. 
The territorial scope of patents and P.B.R, along with the universal reach of 
genetics, creates many concerns regarding licenses’ enforcement and execution 
among parties situated in countries different from the one issuing the IP right. 
24 Commission on genetic resources for food and agriculture. Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. Potential impacts of genetic use restriction technolo-
gies (gurtS) on agrobiodiversity and agricultural production systems, 2001, fao. Available 
at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/015/aj627e.pdf 19. 
25 In the case of Nungesser v Commission, Nungesser developed seeds of maize to be 
cultivated at climatic conditions where it had been considered unsuitable for its cultiva-
tion. Cf. Case C-258/78. L. C. Nungesser v Commission, 1982, ecr 02015. 
26 Patent Cooperation Treaty. Chapter I. International Application and International 
Search. 
27 Council and Parliament Regulation (EU) 1257/2012 of 17 December 2012. Imple-
menting enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection, 
2012, OJ L 361/1.
28 U.S. Supreme Court. Vernon Hugh Bowman v. Monsanto Company et al. 569 U. 
S. ____ (2013) 5 ss.
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For instance, does it constitutes patent infringement to use the technology in a 
country where no patent has been granted. Is the licensor entitled to impede the 
licensee from exporting the trait or the products thereof to a country commercially 
appealing both of them but where no patent has been granted29. These issues touch 
with the scope of IP rights over subsequent commercialization of the technology, 
there is no international consensus in this matter, creating uncertainty about the 
international extension of patents and P.B.R. by means of licenses. 
2. licensing practices and segmentation of international markets
2.1. Territorial restrictions and fragmented authorizations 
License agreements vary according with the requirements of the parties and the activi-
ties each of them performs. The license might be transferable, assignable, exclusive 
and limited to a specific territory30. Notwithstanding those particularities, license’s 
main effect is to allow the licensee to perform all, or at least one of three basic activi-
ties: development of basic seeds, production, commercialization of cultivable seeds. It 
might include clauses for each of those basic activities, e.g, during the development 
stage, there are back clauses for the multinational to have access to the records and 
binnacles; at the commercialization stage, promotion obligations force the licensee 
to stimulate the purchase of products manufactured by the licensee31. Also, these 
products normally complement the trait licensed: as it is well-known, Monsanto’s 
Roundup Ready seeds were tolerant to the Roundup herbicide sold by the same 
company, while basf ’s Clearfield Rice is tolerant to basf ’s Clearfield herbicide. 
The promotion might imply just providing information about the advantages 
of using both products together32, it can also ty the sale of the seed to the purchase 
of the complementary product33 or even force farmers to conclude stewardship 
agreements to purchase the seeds. These stewardship agreements implement an 
ongoing oversight and guidance on how to use the technology for its adequate 
implementation, performance and dissemination34. it will state how the farmer 
29 Case C-193/83 Windsurfing Intl. Inc. v Commission, 1986, ecr, p. 611.
30 Neagley, Clinton H., “Patent Licensing for Small Agricultural Biotechnology 
Companies”, in Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural Innovation: 
A Handbook of Best Practices, mihr and pipra, 2007, p. 216.
31 Leach, Mark; Mesquita, Luiz and Downey, David, “Case study: Partnering 
strategies in a bio tech. world: The case of Dairyland Seed Company”, The Journal of 
Business & Industrial Marketing, 2001, 16(3), p. 226.
32 Ibid. 
33 Clause 4(t) Grower agrees. Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement (Limited 
Use License). 2016 In Monsanto. 2016TUG U.S. Technology Use Guide and Irm Over-
view. (38). Available at: http://www.monsanto.com/products/documents/2016_tug_final.pdf See 
also David A. Hennessy. Dermot J. Hayes. Competition and Tying in Agrichemical and 
Seed Markets. [2000] 22(2) Review of Agricultural Economics, 389-406.
34 Cahoon, Richard S., “Licensing Agreements in Agricultural Biotechnology”, in 
Intellectual Property Management Intellectual Property Management in Health and Agricultural 
Innovation: A Handbook of Best Practices, mihr and pipra 2007, p. 1013.
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should control pests and weeds35 and prohibit the reuse of seeds36. It will also 
include the payment of fees over any IP right embedded within the seed: patents 
and P.B.R.37. 
Following the above, licenses over traits normally have two features: the au-
thorizations granted are fragmented and limited to a clearly determine territory, 
sometimes with exclusivity. A license will never grant the licensee complete and 
absolute freedom to use and commercialize the trait, to the opposite and as was 
explain earlier, the license is employed to grant the multinational certain control 
over subsequent stages of seed development and commercialization. Equally, ter-
ritorial restrictions imposed upon all and each party involved impede licensors 
to conduct the authorized activities out of the territory specified in agreement, 
hence they cannot compete with other licensees to which other territories have 
been allocated. The territory might be a single or several countries and they may 
or not coincide with country where the patent was granted. 
As the next section will develop further, the explanation behind those licensing 
practices is twofold: firstly, the self-reproduction nature of seeds makes impossible 
to license only the right to use the seed and, afterwards, return it to the patentee, 
using the licensed technology, the seed, necessarily implies its full consumption38. 
Secondly, the IP right might terminate with the first sale of the seed containing the 
trait, as long as the seeds are licensed instead of sold, the patentee will be able to 
interfere in and profiting from subsequent stages of commercialization39. Behind 
licensing restrictions is the fear of losing control over the IP rights.
2.2. Uncertainty of exhaustion 
The exhaustion doctrine determines a substantial part of IP rights scope: the point 
on which the right to exclude others from using and commercializing an item 
containing the invention terminates. It is important to notice that exhaustion 
does not annuls the IP right itself, it would remain valid until a judgement decides 
otherwise or until 20 years pass. The exhaustion doctrine only concerns the control 
upon particular items containing the invention protected. 
In general terms, the ‘item’s first sale’ exhausts the patent regardless of whether 
it is made directly by the patentee or with his approval, i.e., licensee authorized 
to sell. Thus, the IP right holder receives a reward from its creativity but is also 
35 Monsanto. 2016tug U.S. Technology Use Guide and Irm Overview. (3-5) Available 
at: http://www.monsanto.com/products/documents/2016_tug_final.pdf 
36 basf Corporation. Clearfield Wheat Stewardship Guide 2014-2015. (2) Available at: 
http://agproducts.basf.us/products/research-library/clearfield-wheat-stewardship-guidelines.
pdf See also: Clause 4(f ) and 4(g) Grower agrees. 2016 Monsanto Technology/Steward-
ship Agreement (n. 33).
37 Ibid., Clause 4(s).
38 Lim, D., (n. 23) 603.
39 Winston, Elizabeth I., “Why sell what you can license?”, George Mason Law 
Review 9, 2006, p. 14. 
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refrain from seeking continuous payments for each transaction over the item40. 
There is no international consensus about the acts triggering the exhaustion, what 
constitutes a sale, whether post-sale restrictions in licenses could circumvent the 
exhaustion, nor about the geographic effects of it. Actually, countries have carte 
blanche to shape exhaustion as they see fit, as it was excluded from trips41. 
In the U.S., for instance, exhaustion is trigger by the first sale which can be 
conditional or restricted to one or several of the rights granted by the IP right. As 
mentioned, patents grant various rights: to offer for sale, sale, use, make, import 
the invention42. The IP holder may waive those rights partially or completely by 
transferring just one or several of them through licenses. As long as the sale is 
conditional, the patent is not exhausted because the rights are not waived com-
pletely43. Inversely, using the item for a purpose different from the one authorized 
constitutes patent infringement44. 
Again, Bowman v. Monsanto illustrates how conditional sales circumvent the 
exhaustion of IP rights. Bowman replanted seeds intended for consumption, 
not for harvest. Because of the exhaustion, the patentee is not entitled to extract 
further economic rents from downstream commercialization of the seed; albeit 
the purchaser is neither entitled to replicate the patented item45, as patent rights 
“revives” after the sale of the seed, if it is reproduced for growing purposes rather 
than used as a commodity46.When dealing with patents upon living matter capable 
of self-reproducing. Such construction of the exhaustion doctrine could render 
final seed consumers as infringers of IP rights they ignored47, creating uncertainty 
upon the scope of the IP rights and the legitimacy of further transactions upon 
protected items.
The geographical reach of the doctrine is also uncertain. Some countries apply 
a national exhaustion doctrine, meaning that the first sale of the item will exhaust 
the right only within that country48; therefore, it is possible to impede parallel 
imports of an item manufactured abroad. Others countries have adopted an in-
ternational exhaustion rule under which, once the item is sold for the first time, 
the IP rights over it would be exhausted around the world, and it would not be 
possible to prevent importations because IP rights infringement49. 
40 Lim, D., (n. 23) 608. 
41 Cf. trips, Article 6. 
42 U.S. Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 
976 F. 2d 700. (1992).
43 Ibid., 17.
44 Ibid., 21.
45 Bowman v Monsanto (n. 28) 10.
46 Ibid.
47 Lim, D., (n. 23) 592. 
48 Forsyth, Miranda and Warwic, Rothnie, “Parallel Imports”, in Steven D. An-
derman (ed.), The Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 430.
49 Ibid.
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On the other hand, the European exhaustion doctrine is sui generis: it states 
that patents are exhausted whenever the item “has been lawfully distributed on 
the market in another Member state by the actual proprietor of the right or with 
his consent”50. It aims to foster the free movement of goods within the European 
Economic Area (E.E.A) by avoiding undue restrictions arising from the territo-
riality of national IP rights51. As said earlier, IP rights granted by each Member 
States and by European Patent Office have territorial scope, meaning that the 
holder of national or European patents could prevent importations which might 
constitute an infringement of its rights. For example, a patentee could prevent 
the importation of an item manufactured under a license in country A to the ter-
ritory of country B, alleging that it is an infringement of its patents in country B. 
Without the exhaustion doctrine, IP rights territoriality will render nugatory the 
establishment of a single market within Member States52. 
Altogether, the uncertainty surrounding the exhaustion of national IP rights 
facilitates the erection of artificial boundaries for international trade. The imposi-
tion of export and import restrictions and conferring absolute territorial protection 
may be without the scope of IP rights in the relevant territory, as grating open 
exclusive licenses agreeing not to compete with the licensor within a specific terri-
tory. Thus, patent holders could distort competition in foreign markets by means 
of license agreements.
There is nothing new in license agreements hampering international trade. trips 
Article 40 recognizes that certain licensing practices might restrict international 
trade and technology transfer; moreover, it provides that countries may implement 
appropriate measures to prevent such practices. Beyond this provision, there is 
no much guidance about which license practice might be abusive nor regarding 
the measures member states could implement. There have been initiatives for 
Draft International Antitrust Code, but these have failed to reach international 
consensus53. However, the application of competition law regimes in the import-
ing country might offer a solution to the segmentation of international markets. 
2.3. national antitrust regimes could offer a solution 
As has been discuss, anticompetitive license agreements not always involve un-
dertakings located in the same country nor within the boundaries of the country 
affected by it, also the dominant position is held not within the internal market 
50 Case C-61/97, fdv v Laserdisken, 1998, ecr I-05171 § 13.
51 Westkamp, Guido, “Intellectual Property, Competition Rules, and the Emerging 
Internal Market: Some Thoughts on the European Exhaustion Doctrine”, 11 Intellectual 
Property L. Rev., 2007, p. 317.
52 Cf. Treaty Establishing the European Community, of 10 November 1997. O.J. C 
340/112. Article 30. See also Nungesser v. Commission (n. 25), pp. 2033 ss. 
53 Fikentscher, Wolfgang, “The Draft International Antitrust Code (diac) in the 
Context of International Technological Integration - The Institutional and Jurisdictional 
Architecture”, 72 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev., 1996, p. 533. 
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but in the international one. Nevertheless, the anticompetitive effect and ineffi-
ciencies might hinder a particular national market. Therefore, the effect doctrine 
entitles national authorities to judge under their national competition law regime 
anticompetitive behaviors originated beyond their frontiers to protect the internal 
market54. 
The motivations of each country to apply or not its competition law to IP-
agreements restricting international trade vary55. Firstly, because the effects of 
an anticompetitive restriction to international trade might not be seen in the 
exporting country with jurisdiction over the company imposing such restrictions. 
Secondly, countries might not challenge such restrictions in order to support inter-
national trade activities of their nationals, for instance, to help them circumvent 
international exhaustion rules that might lessen their possibilities of profiting for 
international markets56, which might be disadvantageous compared to national 
exhaustion rules applied in other jurisdictions57. 
In a similar vein, the importing country might have strong incentives to use 
its competition law to avoid contractual restrictions having effect in its internal 
market. The licensed technology might be a required input for the production of its 
exportations; having access to such technology could also foster new developments 
in this area within the country, the business activities and international expansion 
of its nationals might be hinder by the license restrictions; the restrictions might 
unduly limit parallel importations and goods supply for the internal market, etc. 
In that sense, despite concluding the license agreement outside of the country 
promised to a single seed grower, if the competition within the importing country 
market is being distort, its laws are applicable to the agreement or abusive conduct 
and might tackle international segmentation of markets. 
The concentration in the seed market and the imposition of abusive license 
agreements has different repercussions in each country due to differences in mat-
ters like the approvals for the commercialization of genetically engineer food, the 
importance of agriculture within the states’ economy, the relevance of encourag-
ing foreign investment, the need for technology transfer agreements, etc. These 
nuances must be weight when addressing the effects of the licenses granted by 
multinationals to local undertakings. Nonetheless, an approach to how other 
jurisdictions address the anticompetitive concerns arising from abusive license 
agreements provides valuable insights. 
54 Daniels, Timothy P., “Keep the License Agreements Coming: The Effects of J.E.M. 
Ag Supply, Incorporated v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Incorporated on Universities’ 
Use of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Their Plant Genetic Research”, 2003, byu 
Educ. & L.J. 771 Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2003/iss2/11
55 Conde Gallego, Beatriz, “The principle of exhaustion of rights and its implica-
tions for competition law”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law, 2003, 34(5), 473-502.
56 Ibid., 7.
57 Ibid., 9.
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3. national approaches 
This section describes the approaches taken in the European Union, U.S, Brazil 
and Argentina regarding license agreements establishing territorial or post-sale 
restrictions affecting the internal market of each country. 
3.1. European Union 
The agricultural sector is the paramount for the implementation of the European 
Union (E.U) itself. It deserved particular consideration in the ttfeu whereby it was 
subjected to special competition rules58. In addition, the European seed industry is 
the biggest in the word but it is also highly concentrated59. In 2014, traits supply 
for the development of seed varieties was centered in six major companies, while, 
at the downstream level, there were around 7000 seed related companies, between 
growers, multipliers and retailers located mainly in Poland and Romania60.
According with a report issued by the European Competition Network in 2012, 
there have been isolated cases of anticompetitive behavior in the seeds market61. 
One in Portugal62 and another in Spain63 related with license agreements, but no 
pronouncement was made by any European authority in those cases. Nevertheless, 
the European Commission in two cases related with restrictions to the exportation 
established in licenses of P.B.R. addressed two main issues: i) the difference between 
sole license agreements and exclusive licenses with absolute territorial protection 
and; ii) the consideration of the effect of a cluster or bundle of restrictive contracts 
concluded by several undertakings at the same level of the value chain. 
In LC Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission, Mr. Eisele was the ex-
clusive licensee for the production and commercialization of maize varieties in 
Germany. The licensor agreed not sale directly nor authorize third parties to sale 
maize varieties in Germany. By threats of legal enforcement of IP rights issued in 
Germany, parties systematically prevented the importation of maize purchased 
from the licensor in France64. Constructing Article 85(1) Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (ecct), the Court of Justice of the European Union (cjeu) 
distinguished between open exclusive license agreements and exclusive licenses with 
58 Cf. Article 42 and 43(2) ttfeu. See also Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 
n.º 1308/2013 Establishing a common organization of the markets in agricultural prod-
ucts. [2013] OJ L 347.
59 Mammana, Ivan, “Concentration of market power in the EU seed market”, 2014, 
Study commissioned by the greens/efa group in the European parliament. Available at: 
http://www.esporus.org/recursos/Documents%20interessants/Documents/Seeds-study_UK_28-01V3.pdf 
60 Ibid., 21.
61 European Competition Network. Report on competition law enforcement and 
market monitoring activities by European competition authorities in the food sector, 
2012. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf 
62 Ibid., § 138.
63 Ibid., § 201.
64 Case 258/78 (n. 25) § 8.
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absolute territorial protection65. The formers are not by themselves incompatible 
with the Article 85(1), they may encourage the development of the technology 
licensed66. To the opposite, exclusive licenses extended to no signatories, due to 
the absolute territorial protection agreed, “in order to enable parallel imports to be 
controlled and prevented results in the artificial maintenance of separate national 
markets, [are] contrary to the Treaty”67. All the more, considering that the P.B.R. 
were exhausted once the maize varieties were sold in France. 
In the same case, the parties argued the application of Article 85(3) ecct because 
the territorial exclusivity provided the security required for the licensee to enter the 
German market. That is, it improved the production and distribution of goods in 
Germany. This argument was rejected by the cjeu holding that “absolute territorial 
protection manifestly goes beyond what is indispensable for the improvement of 
production or distribution or the promotion of technical progress”68.
The second case was referred by the Commercial Court of Liège for the inter-
pretation of Article 85(1). The agreement was celebrated between a seed breeder 
Louis Erauw-Jacquery sprl and a seed propagator, La Hesbignonne, for the propa-
gation and sale of basic seed which exportation was prohibited. To the question of 
whether such restriction infringed Article 85(1) ecct, the cjeu answered in the 
negative acknowledging that it is a measure for the breeder to control the basic 
subject-matter of its right69. The basic seed is indispensable for the propagation of 
the protected plant variety, if it can be freely reproduced, there would be no prize 
for the creation of new varieties70. 
The license in the case above also fixed the price of the seed, the same price 
was agreed with every propagator the plant breeder conclude agreements with. It 
could have the effect of a horizontal cartel agreement. Article 85(1) prohibits any 
agreement which directly or indirectly fix prices. However, the agreement would 
be subject to Article 85(1) only if it affected trade between Member States to an 
appreciable degree71 which was to be decided by the national authority taking 
into account, three factors: i) whether the agreement is part of a bundle of similar 
contracts; ii) plant breeder’s market share in regard with the seed; and iii) producers 
ability to export the seed (not the basic seed but its offspring)72. 
To sum up, the cjeu has up held exclusive license agreements by which the 
parties establish certain territorial or commercial restrains to safeguard the incen-
tives for them to invest in the development of new technologies and disseminate 
that technology. Complete protection from third competitors, does not deserve 
65 Ibid., § 53.
66 Ibid., § 58.
67 Ibid., § 61.
68 Ibid., § 77.
69 Case C 27/87. sprl Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC. [1988] ecr 
01919-1935, § 11.
70 Ibid., § 10.
71 Ibid., § 17, 19.
72 Ibid., § 18.
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the same treatment because its detrimental effects on the endeavors of third parties 
threaten the functioning and competitiveness of the entire market. Additionally, the 
market may be affected by combine effect of a bundle of restrictive agreements, if 
the parties involved on those agreements have a significant market share in regard 
with a particular seed. 
3.2. United States
The antitrust assessment of license agreements within the transgenic seed industry 
in the U.S. is complex, there are many intertwine considerations regarding the 
regulatory framework within the U.S. and its application in the international level. 
In the first place, many of the biggest transgenic seed markets are incorporated 
there, also the patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
are licensed by these companies on worldwide bases to seed growers. The U.S ex-
ports the raw materials for the international transgenic seed market and the ones 
derived from it: innovation, genetic traits, and transgenic seed.
In the second place, innovations related with the transgenic industry are over 
protected through IP rights. It has reinforced the market power of multination-
als in the international market. The U.S offers a threefold system to protect the 
developments achieve in the transgenic seed industry: Firstly, microorganism and 
genes are patentable subject matter73; secondly, sexually reproduced plant variet-
ies are protectable under utility patents74; and thirdly, new plant varieties can be 
safeguard under the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act. None of these IP rights 
excludes the issuance of another over the same matter75. Naturally, all those IP 
rights can be licensed and are perfect tools to gain market power.
In addition, the case of Bowman v. Monsanto patronizes license prohibitions of 
reutilizing seed, as the exhaustion doctrine forbids farmers to copy the patented 
product. Even though the latter case of Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics 
Inc. could be construct as entitling the reutilization of transgenic seeds76. In the 
latter, the Supreme Court held that the sale of an item embodying the essential 
features of the invention, and which only reasonable use is to practice the inven-
tion, exhaust patents rights77. This, could mean that by selling seeds containing 
genetic trait, IP rights over it are exhaust and farmers could reuse the seed, as it 
is its reasonable intended purpose; Quanta Computer did not address the issue of 
self-replicating technologies, as was the case in Bowman v. Monsanto where the 
Supreme Court make clear that its decision was limited to genetically modified 
73 U.S. Supreme Court. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 447 U.S. 303.
74 Cf. Plant Patent Act of 1930. 
75 Cf. U.S. Supreme Court. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 
Inc. 534 U. S. 124 [2001].
76 U.S. Supreme Court. Quanta Computer Inc v. LG Electrics Inc. Quanta Computer, 
Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 553 U.S. 617 [2008].
77 Ibid., 18. 
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soybeans78. Therefore, until the judgement regarding the soybeans is overruled, 
the exhaustion does not allow farmers to reuse seeds but it does entitle IP right 
holders to charge fees. 
The above issues obstruct the assessment of license practices in the transgenic 
seed market within the U.S. There have being attempts to evaluate possible viola-
tions of the Sherman Act by Monsanto’s license agreements by the Department 
of Justice (doj); however the investigation was closed without initiating any legal 
action against the company79. This despite of the U.S. Department of Justice issuing 
guidelines for the licensing of IP right under which the practices of the company 
would deserve further inquiries80. 
Regarding the assessment of the transgenic license terms in the international 
market, U.S is one of the few countries having a statute stablishing the requirements 
to judge under its competition law conducts originated abroad. The Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (ftaia), clarify when an agreement or abusive 
conducts that had restricted trade with foreign nations trigger the application of 
the Sherman Act. Following the ftaia, it would happen when such conducts have 
a “direct, substantial, and reasonable foreseeable effect in import commerce from 
other nations or in export commerce of a person in the United States”81. 
The ftaia has not been interpreted uniformly, courts disagree on whether it 
stablish subject matter jurisdiction or whether its requirements relates to the mer-
its of the claim. Equally, there are different interpretations as to what is a direct, 
substantial and reasonable foreseeable effect in the commerce or trade of the U.S. 
This disagreement about the construction of the ftaia impede the application of 
U.S. antitrust regime to license agreements affecting the internal market of that 
country as the threshold for courts hearing these cases is not clear82. Moreover, the 
application of the ftaia and, consequently, of the Sherman Act to address anti-
competitive behavior of U.S. companies exclusively affecting foreign markets has 
been denied explicitly.
In the case of United States v. lsl Biotechnologies, the Court of Appeals of the 
Ninth Circuit hold that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the ftaia because 
the conduct did not have a direct effect on U.S. commerce83. Due to an agreement 
between lsl Biotechnologies and Hazera Quality Seeds, the later agreed not to 
78 Bowman v. Monsanto (n. 28) 10. 
79 Monsanto Notified that U.S. Department of Justice Has Concluded Its Inquiry. 
Available at: http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/pages/monsanto-notified-that-us-department-of-
justice-has-concluded-its-inquiry.aspx Accessed 29/7/2016. 
80 U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property. [1995]. Available at: https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/0558.pdf 
81 Act of 1982 (ftaia). 15 U.S. Code § 6a - Conduct involving trade or commerce 
with foreign nations.
82 Lu, Diane, “In the Face of Strong Patent Rights: Using the Foreign Trade Anti-
trust Improvements Act to Combat Patent Abuse in International Commerce”, buj Sci. 
& Tech. L., 21, 2015, p.136.
83 U.S. United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004).
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import long shelf-life tomato seeds into the U.S., which was reserved exclusively 
for lsl. The Court of Appeals reasoned that a direct effect on trade means an 
immediate consequence in the defendant activity banning him from engaging 
in trade. As there was no proof of Hazera having any alternative technology to 
preserve tomatoes fresh, nor any indication of it being able of developing it in a 
foreseeable term, “any innovation that Hazera would bring to American consumers 
is speculative at best and doubtful at worst. An effect cannot be “direct” where it 
depends on such uncertain intervening developments”84.
To the opposite, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in the case Minn-
Chem Inc. v. Agrium Inc85 rejected the above interpretation of the ftaia arguing that 
there is a direct effect whenever the conduct has “a reasonably proximate causal 
nexus”86 with the effect in the American market; arguing that the aim of the U.S. 
antitrust law is not to punish all whom it can catch but only those behaviors hav-
ing undue consequences in the U.S. market87. 
In addition to the direct, substantial and reasonable foreseeable restriction to 
U.S. trade, the plaintiff has to stablish that the measure gives rise to its claim. The 
effect on the U.S. commerce must have a causal relationship with the damage suf-
fered by the plaintiff. In the case of Lotes Co Ltd v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co 
is illustrative88, the defendant refused to grant a license over a standard essential 
technology foreclosing the plaintiff from manufacturing and importing devices to 
the U.S. Although the direct, substantial and reasonable foreseeable restriction on 
U.S. trade was stablished, the court refused to assess the conduct of the American 
company. Following the court, the ftaia made clear that “to American exporters 
(and to firms doing business abroad) that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from 
entering into business arrangements […], however anticompetitive, as long as those 
arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets”89.
As a result, U.S regulatory framework may facilitate anticompetitive license 
practices, as multinationals holders of IP rights issued in this country have a strong 
protection while face reduce possibilities of being prosecuted for engaging in anti-
competitive behavior abroad. This has as potential effect of foreclosure of foreign 
open markets90. An American IP holder might impose exporting prohibitions in 
its license agreements creating an artificial division of international markets, in 
countries that might be open to parallel imports. Therefore, the whole burden of 
chasing international anti-competitive agreements, lies on the importing country. 
84 Ibid.
85 U.S. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., [683 F.3d 845] (7th Cir. 2012).
86 Ibid., 858.
87 Ibid. 
88 U.S. Lotes Co Ltd v. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. 13-2280, 2014 WL 2487188 
at *1 (2d Cir. June 4, 2014).
89 Ibid. 
90 Conde Gallego, B., (n. 55) 7.
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3.3. Brazil 
In contrast with most nations, which adopt reactive measures, Brazil opted for 
a preventive approach to deal with the hazards arising for technology transfer 
agreements and its impact within its internal market. In accordance with Article 
90 of the Brazilian Antitrust Act, a technology transfer agreement constitutes a 
concentration act subject to approval by Administrative Council for Economic 
Defense (cade)91. It will assess whether the act poses a substantial an unjustified 
restriction to competition by considering the rationale of the agreement, its real 
impact on the internal market while considering the importance of accessing high 
technology inputs and tools for the development of the market92. Missing the 
notification, the parties might face high fines and the agreement could be null.
The cade has appraised several licenses regarding traits of soya93, the most 
cultivated genetically modified seed in Brazil. In 2012 Monsanto do Brasil Ltda 
intended to conclude agreements with five seed growers in Brazil for the develop-
ment, multiplication and commercialization of basic seeds containing technology 
Intacta RR2 pro making soya resistant to glyphosate and insects. Those agreements 
gave Monsanto access to information elaborated during the stages of development 
and field test of the new varieties the growers might create. Albeit the agreements 
were not exclusive and the growers were entitled to sublicense the technology 
provided by Monsanto, such sublicenses were subject to regulations provided by 
in the original licenses. Based on the huge influence Monsanto would gain over 
grower’s business94 as well as the low incentives left for them to develop competing 
technologies, the agreements were rejected by the cade95. 
Several aspects of the Brazilian law stand out from the general approach to 
licenses agreements and their impact in the structure of the internal market, al-
though there is no complete consensus about them. First, the perspective of licenses 
agreements as merger submissions or acts of concentration capable of harming the 
structure of the market is disputed. Article 90 of the Brazilian antitrust act describes 
as acts of concentrations acquisitions and mergers; however, license agreements do 
not fit within these categories. The majority position in the approval requested by 
Monsanto do Brazil Ltda and Don Mario Sementes Ltda96, agreed that a corpora-
tion could control another through the obligations and commitments included 
91 Antitrust Act 12.529/2011. Article 90. 
92 Barrios, Lucas, “O contrato internacional de transferência de tecnologia e o Direito 
da Concorrência no Brasil: análise à luz da recente jurisprudência do Cade”, Revista de 
Defesa da Concorrência, 2014, 2(2), pp. 128-129.
93 Cf. Brazil. cade. Monsanto do Brasil Ltda - Syngenta Proteção de Cultivos Ltda 
Administrative Process n.º 08012.002870/2012-38. Monsanto do Brasil Ltda - Nidera 
Sementes Ltda AC. n.º 08012.006706/2012-08. Monsanto do Brasil Ltda Cooperativa 
Central de Pesquisa Agrícola AC n.º 08700.003898/2012-34. Monsanto do Brasil Ltda 
Bayer S.A. AC n.º 08700.004957/2013-72. 
94 Barrios, L., (n. 92).
95 Ibid. 
96 Brazil. cade. AC n.º 087000.003937/2012-01. Councillor Alessandro Octaviani Luis. 
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in licenses. The dependence of one party on the technology provided by another 
might lead to give the later control over the former, create a form of external control, 
despite of not using the traditional means to take over a business97. 
Second, the importance of preserving the market open for the development of 
new technologies and seed varieties is paramount within approval of the license 
agreements by the cade. The license between Monsanto do Brasil and Don Mario 
Sementes Ltda. contained a system of rewards and rebates, which might discourage 
the latter of implementing third party technologies and from developing its own, 
as the ones provided by Monsanto would be more profitable98. Although the ex-
clusive use of Monsanto’s technology was not explicit, the real effect of the rebates 
was to barrier the entrance of competitors with their own seeds99. In addition, the 
cade pointed at the relevance of applying antitrust law in coherence with public 
polices implemented to promote the development of biotechnology in Brazil100. 
And thirdly, the doctrine in Brazil has notice that despite the fact that those 
agreements are concluded between the affiliates of multinationals incorporated in 
Brazil to be effective therein, they have an international element derived from the 
fact that those licenses “directly involve the seizure of large international economic 
groups and, indirectly, the international technology flow.”101
Although the standard for the approval of license agreements is high, it is not 
impossible to fulfil it. On January 2016, the cade approved an agreement enabling 
Bayer to develop, produce and commercialize the Intacta Pro RR2 Technology. 
The approval was conditioned to modifications in the royalty payment method. 
Initially, the mechanism included a rebate for Bayer in case of producing certain 
percentage of Monsanto’s soya, meaning that a competitor of Monsanto would have 
to adjust its price cover the rebate; it created a burden for the entry of competing 
technologies into the market102. Moreover, the initial agreement gave Monsanto 
the right of first refusal in case Bayer were for sale, with the modification ordered 
by the cade, this clause was eliminated from the contract. Once again, the grounds 
for the modifications was avoiding any kind of external control on Bayer from 
Monsanto. 
3.4. Argentina
The dispute over the transgenic seed market in Argentina illustrates the anticom-
petitive issue addressed here. That is, the use of license agreements to secure the 
97 Ibid., § 28-33.
98 Ibid. cade. AC n.º 087000.003937/2012-01. Councillor Eduardo Pontual Ribeiro, 
§ 58.
99 Ibid., § 61.
100 cade. AC n.º 087000.003937/2012-01. Councillor Alessandro Octaviani Luis, § 36. 
101 Barrios, L., (n. 92) 132.
102 Brazil. cade. ACNo.08700.004957/2013-72. Monsanto do Brasil Ltda Bayer S.A. 
Councillor Alessandro Octaviani Luis. AC. § 145 ss. 
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payment of royalties from each party involved in the production of transgenic seeds 
and derivate products pursuant the enforcement of IP rights, in this case granted 
in foreign nations, while restricting international trade. 
In 2005, three cargoes of soy meal from Argentina were detained in the port 
of Amsterdam due to the alleged infringement of a European patent granted to 
Monsanto, relating to ‘Glyphosate tolerant 5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate 
synthases’103, the Round Up Ready technology (R.R. technology). Monsanto 
initiated similar actions in England, Spain and Denmark104. The proceedings in 
Holland gave rise to a judgement by the cjeu holding the protection granted by 
the Directive 98/44/EC105 did not cover the soy transformed into flour because the 
RR genes would not perform their function of glyphosate tolerance anymore106. 
Monsanto withdrew its claims after reaching a settlement107.
The international trade of soy and its derivatives is paramount for Argentinian 
economy, as it is the main exportation product, 90% of the soy planted contains 
the RR technology, which was introduced in the country by Monsanto in the 
1990’s108. The importance of protecting its international trade move the govern-
ment of Argentina to intervene before the cjeu, the judicial authorities in Holland 
and to initiate proceedings before the National Commission for the Defense of 
Competition in Argentina (ncdc). The Government argued that Monsanto´s 
lawsuits in Europe constitute an abuse of its dominant position infringing the 
Antitrust Act n.º 25.156 as it was generating uncertainty around the legality of 
the exportations of Argentinian soy to Europe. 
The ncdc agreeing with the government issued a resolution to investigate the 
case109. On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeals for Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters (Cámáaa Civil y Comercial Federal Sala iii) did not find sufficient evidence 
of Monsanto’s dominant position, upheld Monsanto’s argument of the lawsuits 
being a legitimate action to enforce its legal rights within the European jurisdic-
tion, and revoked the previous decisions110. 
103 Case C-428/08. Monsanto Technology llc v Cefetra BV., 2010, ecr I-06765. 
104 Carlos Correa. Monsanto vs. Argentina, 2006, Le Monde Diplomatique [El Diplo]. 
Available at: http://www.insumisos.com/diplo/NODE/813.HTM 
105 Cf. Article 9. Council Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions, 1998, O.J. L 213/13.
106 Case C 428/08. (n. 103) § 46.
107 The Netherlands. The Hague District Court. Monsanto Technology llc v. Cefetra 
B.V., The State of Argentina et al. and Monsanto Technology llc v. Vopak Agencies 
Rotterdam B.V. and Alfred C. Toepfer International GmbH, Docket Decision, 23 June 
2010, Case n.º HA ZA 05-2885 and HA ZA 06-2576.
108 Instituto de Investigación Económica y Política ciudadana isepci. La Reforma de 
la Ley de Semillas en Argentina. Análisis de la Propuesta del Gobierno y sus Princi-
pales Impulsores. [2014] isepci. Available at: http://www.isepci.org.ar/descargas/publicaciones/
la-reforma-de-la-ley-de-semillas-en-argentina-analisis-de-la-propuesta-del-gobierno-y-sus-principales-
impulsores_117.pdf 4.
109 Argentina. National Chamber of Appeals in Civil and Commercial Federal Chamber 
iii. “Monsanto Company s/ Apelación Resolución Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la 
Competencia. Acumulada”. File number 638/2008. 
110 Ibid.
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More recently, Monsanto has celebrated two kinds of contracts to secure the 
payment of biotechnology fees. First, under the Extended Royalty System (ers), 
seed growers agree to pay an extra fee for reusing the seed; the grower also has to 
inform quantities of seed harvested and reused. Argentinian law does not endorse 
those agreements. The Law of Seeds allows farmers to reuse seed from previous 
harvest111, while under the ers the use of a protected variety is subject to fees and 
prior authorizations. In that sense, the res is closer to upov 1991, where farmer’s 
privilege is no longer a compulsory but optional for each country to implement112. 
Therefore, the ers legal support in Argentina lies in the parties’ will to conclude 
such an agreement rather than in the exercise IP rights.
The second kind of agreements Monsanto has implemented, forces collectors 
and exporters to oversight the payment of fees and fine those growers or farmers 
refusing to pay. The oversight system has two parts: one, when farmers and grow-
ers agree to pay a fee for the use of the technology when purchasing the seed from 
the authorized retailers or when delivering the grain to authorized collectors and 
exporters113. The other, when collectors and exporters test grain deliver by farmers 
and growers searching for Monsanto’s technology; if such technology is found, 
farmers are charged unless they probe they already payed; the fee could even be 
discount from the grain price114. Collectors and exporters also have to store the 
grains apart from other not containing the RR technology, which implies costly 
modifications on their facilities115. 
Due to the pressure created by those agreements in the downstream market, 
in 2015, the Association of grain collectors, or gathering companies, in Argentina 
resort to the judiciary arguing that the agreements impose anticompetitive restric-
tions on their business in violation of the Antitrust Act n.º 25.156. The Association 
alleged that Monsanto was abusing of its dominant position to create a cartel of 
collecting companies, because only those who agree to its terms could gather soy 
grain from farmers and export it without risk of facing lawsuits abroad116. In June 
2016, the Federal Court for Civil and Commercial Matters denied to hear the 
case alleging lack of jurisdiction. The authority held that the competence to judge 
111 Argentina. Law No.20.247. Law of Seeds and Phytogenetic Creations. 30/3/73. 
Available at: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/30000-34999/34822/texact.htm#1 
112 Cf. Article 5(3) upov1978 and Article 15 upov1991. See also: Anabel Marin. El 
futuro de las semillas y la agricultura en Argentina. [2014]. Centro Steps para America 
Latina. Available at: https://stepsamericalatina.org/el-futuro-de-las-semillas-y-la-agricultura-en-
argentina-tecnologias-actores-y-derechos-de-propiedad/ 
113 Rossi, Hugo, “Los nuevos contratos de licencia de uso de soja: ¿cómo son? ¿Qué 
implicancias tienen?”, 2014, Consultor Agropecuario n.º 11. Errepar. Available at: http://
www.rossiamadeo.com.ar/#!blogger-feed/c1ktv/post/5790432689409546181 
114 Argentina. Cámara Civil y Comercial Federal- Sala iii. com 15824/2015/CA1 
“Federación de Centros y Entidades Gremiales de Acopiadores de Cereales c. Monsanto 
Argentina SA y otros s. amparo”. Buenos Aires, 2 de junio de 2016.
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid.
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antitrust issues belong to the ncdc; the association should have pursued an admin-
istrative process, the final decision of which could be subject to judicial control117.
Equally, the Agrarian Federation of Argentina (faa in its Spanish acronym) 
report Monsanto’s anticompetitive agreements before the ncdc118. faa once again 
argues that Monsanto’s is using its dominant position to secure the payments of 
fess over a technology that is not protected by Argentinian laws, by concluding 
anticompetitive agreements that restrict collectors commercial and export activi-
ties119. ncdc has not render a decision yet.
The case law in Argentina regarding abuse of dominance to impose anticom-
petitive restrains in downstream markers is scarce and even more regarding abusive 
license agreements. Still, the ncdc will have to address paramount issues to decide 
faa’s complain. For instance, whether the agreements could be within the scope of 
the IP rights. Monsanto does not have a patent over the RR technology120; how-
ever, there is no certainty about patents it might held over the Intacta trait, nor 
over plant varieties incorporating that technology. The ncdc will have to evaluate 
Article 38 of the Argentinian Patent law prohibiting of ancillary restrains such 
as exclusive grant back clauses and any other that might be prohibited under the 
Antitrust Act121. Another relevant issue to consider in the complaint by faa is the 
international reach of the principle of exhaustion in Argentina. According with 
its Patent Law, once the item containing the patented technology is legally sold 
anywhere in the world it can be freely traded in Argentina122. 
3.5. Assessment 
The case-law above shows that the use of license agreements by multinationals to 
implement exploitative system within the market of seeds is a real problem, even 
if still there is no case fully addressing the issue. The E.U case-law has focused on 
preserving the competitiveness of the internal market; in the U.S the fulfilment 
of the criteria set up by the ftaia has taken all the attention of the courts, while 
in Argentina the judiciary has refused to hear the cases alleging procedural flaws. 
Within the jurisdictions analyzed, Brazil is the only one which has actually consid-
ered the anticompetitive effects that restrictive licenses agreements might have in its 
seed market and for the development of new technologies. However, it is possible 
117 Ibid. 
118 faa Prensa. faa y Sus Entidades Asociadas Ampliaron Denuncia Contra Monsanto, 
2016. Available at: http://www.faa.com.ar/Contenido/noticia7659.html#.V6dSeU3hDIU 
119 Ibid. 
120 Argentina. Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal. Causa 
n.º 8.044/07/CA1 .Monsanto Technology llc c/ Instituto Nacional de la Propiedad 
Industrial s/ denegatoria de patente.
121 See Law 24.481 on Patents and Utility Models. March 20, 1996. Gazette: 
22/03/1996.
122 Cf. Article 36(c). Law 24.481 on Patents and Utility Models.
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to gather significant issues to be considering when evaluating license agreements 
related with seeds and genetic traits under national competition law regimes. 
1. The case of United States v. lsl Biotechnologies points at the importance of 
weighting the relevance of the technology licensed, and on whether it is feasible 
that alternative sources of technology will be developed in the foreseeable future. 
In cases where there are no alternative providers in the internal market, the license 
and segmentation of the market might not be detrimental of the internal market, as 
it provides a distribution system which enables the entrances of different products 
and technologies into the national market. This consideration will be pondered 
depending on the technological development each country has. In the case of the 
E.U. and the U.S, which are exporters of technology and seeds encouraging the 
dissemination of technology might not be as important as in Brazil, where the 
furtherance of biotechnology has led to the implementation of public policies. 
2. The cases before the cjeu acknowledge that the prohibition against agree-
ments which might affect the free commercialization of goods within the eea is 
not absolute, the allocation of markets may have economic efficiencies. Two main 
issues have to be considered when assessing those efficiencies: i) whether the protec-
tion given by the agreement balances the incentives for the licensee to develop the 
technology licensed with the restrictions that might arise for the business of third 
parties; ii) consider the specific object of the restriction, to preserve the subject 
matter of P.B.R. such restrictions to commerce might be necessary for the actual 
existence of the right; while the restrictions upon the trade of products derived 
from the seed, as soy meal are not justified. 
It worth noticing that those considerations are some of the basic principles for 
the assessment of technology transfer agreements which have been develop further 
under the Technology Transfer Block Exception Regulation123. 
3. Giving the concentration in the upstream level of the seed market, the 
comprehensive dissemination of agreements with market allocation or selective 
distribution provisions could lead to coordinated practices within levels of the 
downstream market. It is paramount to assess the overall impact of several parties 
within the same level of the value chain being subject to equal distribution restric-
tions provided by in license agreements. Such combine effect was condemned by 
the cjeu in Louis Erauw-Jacquery, and it was also denounced by the faa against 
Monsanto in Argentina.
4. From the Brazilian law it worth rescuing the view that license agreements 
may be an instrument for a company to take control over another, or at least on its 
core activities. Provisions imposing quality controls and promotion obligations on 
seed breeders and the stewardship of technologies, could have such effect. The un-
derlying concern in here is the importance of preserving the licensee independence 
123 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014. March 21, 2014 on the application 
of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories 
of technology transfer agreements Text with eea relevance. [2014] OJ L 93/17.
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to conduct its own business as he sees fit, as well as encouraging him to develop 
its own technology, otherwise it will always need technology supplied from third 
parties, would never be able to compete in other markets. 
Conclusions
At first sight, it may appear that the problems raised by restrictive license agreements 
would be easily solved if there was an international consensus on the doctrine of 
exhaustion of IP rights similar to the one adopted by the European Union. To 
say the least this solution is illusory, because such disparity of approaches gives 
countries certain maneuver over their internal market and control over parallel 
imports. Moreover, it could would have implications that at the implementation 
of such rule might hinder the development and dissemination of technology, as it 
will lead to an automatic increase on price on the first sale of the product in order 
to capture profits big enough as to fund further R&D activities. These high prices 
might be prohibitive for certain licensees.
Nevertheless, competition law is an appropriate to avoid abuses from IP right 
holders, but again, its application must be thoughtful and weight overall effect 
of the restrictive licenses. It is important to set thresholds for the application of 
national competition law regimes, to provide certainty and predictability. Natu-
rally, the standard in which country will vary. As occurs in the U.S., providing 
protection for national IP right holder might be more important than opening 
the market for importations, while in Argentina and Brazil preserving the market 
open for the development national technologies might outweigh the protection 
of foreign companies. 
Once the threshold for the application of the national competition law is 
overcome, the analysis should include key issues: whether the market allocation 
set on the agreement incentivizes the development of technology by the licensee 
or whether it obscures third party business activities; whether it imposes such a 
control over the licensee that is independence within the internal market and foreign 
markets where he could export the commodity are affected. It is also paramount to 
evaluate the effect that a bundle of licenses concluded by the dominant firm with 
various undertakings in the same level of the value chain might have in the market. 
All in all, the segmentation of the seed market through license agreements is a 
flourishing discussion. Pending decisions in Argentina and India124, might enlighten 
other considerations not being deeply analyzed yet, like the impact of regulatory 
market approvals, the preservation of traditional knowledge in the development 
of plant varieties, the protection of biodiversity from being appropriated by P.B.R. 
124 India. Competition Commission. Case n.º 2 of 2015 & Case n.º 107 of 2015. 
Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers Welfare v. Mahyco Monsanto Biotech 
(India) Limited February 10, 2016. Available at: http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Ref%20
02-2015%20and%20107-2015%20-26(1)%20order_10.02.2015.pdf
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and of organic crops from being contaminated with transgenic seeds. These matters 
must be added to the anticompetitive assessment of license agreements.
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